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Introduction
During the past few decades, Korea has experienced a continuous and sharp increase in
real estate prices. Demand for real estate has sharply increased, particularly due to
economic development and urbanization. On the other hand, the increase of the real
estate supply has been relatively slow, due to the limited availability of land and various
regulations. Lower returns on ﬁnancial instruments, resulting from ﬁnancial controls and
the underdevelopment of the ﬁnancial system, have been another cause of the rise in real
estate prices. In addition, speculative demand for real estate, fed by expectations of future
price rises has increased real estate prices to unprecedented levels (see Kim, 1991). In fact,
the rate of land price increase in 1987–91 was on average 21.5%, while the inﬂation rate
based upon the consumer price index was on average 6.7% for the same period.
Higher real estate prices are likely to have the following effects in Korea. First, they can
cause a slowdown in the production activities of ﬁrms, because their production costs
increase as the factor price of land rises. Second, the fact that gains from real estate
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Abstract. This study investigates the relationship between changes in real estate prices and
the value of ﬁrms. The main hypothesis is that changes in the value of ﬁrms caused by
expectations of increasing real estate prices will be smaller in magnitude than these in the
value of their real estate holdings since there will be a loss in the value of the ﬁrm
occasioned by the perception of future growth opportunities forgone. The secondary
hypothesis is that the loss in value caused by growth opportunities forgone will be
proportional to the amount of debt ﬁnancing used.
The ﬁndings using a yearly cross-sectional test during 1987–91 indicate that the
proportion of a ﬁrm’s real estate holdings to its total assets had no signiﬁcant effect upon
the return-on-investment in its stocks. However, the higher the debt ratio of the ﬁrm, the
lower the coefﬁcient of the real estate holdings, implying that the value loss of the growth
opportunities forgone becomes larger as the ﬁrm uses more debt. Also these results are not
observed in size analysis. Accordingly, a debt effect is regarded to be clearer than a size
effect in the impact upon stock returns of the real estate holdings.investment are greater than normal labor income or normal proﬁts of the ﬁrm can sap
the work ethic and reduce managerial incentives. Third, a rise in real estate prices can
distort wealth distribution among ﬁrms and individuals, due to differences in holdings of
real estate. Despite these potentially serious effects, however, it is not known to what
degree the rise in real estate prices affects ﬁrms’ management.
This study examines how increases in real estate prices inﬂuence investment activity
and the value of the ﬁrm in Korea. In Korea, it is often said that past increases in real
estate prices have resulted in the decline of ﬁrms’ willingness to invest, thus hindering the
development of the economy. Further, a study by Nourse and Roulac (1993), who try to
link real estate decisions to corporate strategy, suggests that real estate decisions may
inﬂuence the ﬁrm value through corporate strategy.
To address the issue, a traditional ﬁnance framework is used for theoretical develop-
ments and the empirical tests utilize capital market data. This study consists of four
sections. In section two, the effect of real estate price increases on a ﬁrm’s value is derived
theoretically. In section three and four, empirical tests are explained and the results are
reported. The ﬁfth section presents conclusions.
Theoretical Analysis
The Case of No Debt Financing
As in Myers (1973), which examines the determinants of corporate borrowing, we
assume that the market is perfect so that there exists no market imperfections such as
corporate taxes or bankruptcy costs. In addition, it is assumed that the market is
complete so that an investor can construct any future income distributions desired
through a portfolio of pure securities.
Under this situation, Myers (1977) considers the case in which a ﬁrm at period 0
(current period) holds an investment opportunity that can be invested at period 1 (future
period). Since the ﬁrm has a new growth opportunity to invest in the future regardless of
current assets, the total value of the ﬁrm consists of the following two values.
V5VA1VG , (1)
where:
VA5the value of current assets that the ﬁrm holds; and
VG 5the value of the new investment opportunity of the ﬁrm.
In order to analyze the ﬁrm’s growth opportunities, suppose that the ﬁrm decides
whether to accept a new investment opportunity after it knows the realized state at period
1, as in Myers (1977). Also suppose that the same quantity of real estate is needed for the
investment opportunity, regardless of the realized state.
For the project, production factors other than real estate are also needed. Suppose that
cash ﬂows of the project, CF(s,X), with the employment of production factors other than
real estate in a given state, s, are determined as follows:
CF (s,X)5p(s)q(X)2W(s)X , (2)
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p(s)5unit price of the product in a given state(s);
X5quantity vector of production factors other than real estate;
W(s)5[W1(s), W2(s) . . . Wn(s)];
5price vector of production factors other than real estate in a given
state(s); and
q(X)5production function with the factor input X.
The ﬁrm determines quantities of the factor input to maximize CF(s,X) in a given state s.
Let CF(s) be the cash ﬂow of the state s under the optimal employment of the factor
input. And as in Myers (1977), if the states are arranged along the vertical axis as CF(s)
increases, Exhibit 1 will be derived. Of course, CF(s) do not have to be a linear function
of s as in Exhibit 1.
Suppose that the market value of the real estate needed for the project in state s at
period 1 under the above premise is ML(s). Also it is assumed that acquisition of the real
estate is ﬁnanced solely by equity and no debt ﬁnancing is needed.
Then, the ﬁrm makes an investment only if cash ﬂows, CF(s), exceed the market value
of the real estate, ML(s). Otherwise it would reject the project. This case is shown in
Exhibit 1. For the convenience of analysis, it is assumed that the real estate price in period
1 is a linearly increasing function of state s in Figure 1. This, of course, is not a binding
requirement.1
As shown in Exhibit 1, the investment period for the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity begins
with state sa. Therefore the pure value of the investment opportunity omitting the real
estate value is represented as a shaded area and the value of the investment opportunity,
VG, becomes as follows:
(3)
     
V y s CF s ML s d s G Sa = -
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Determination of a Firm’s Investment for Growth Opportunity with No
Debt Financingwhere:
y(s)5current value of the pure security which pays one dollar at state s and
pays none at the other states.
Suppose that the real estate price for state s in period 1 increases by DML for any
reasons.2,3 Accordingly, the amount needed for the purchase of the same amount of real
estate for state s in period 1 increases to ML(s)1DML. Therefore, in this case the
acceptance region for the investment opportunity begins with sb, not sa in Exhibit 2. Thus
the net value of the ﬁrm’s investment opportunity omitting the real estate costs, VG,
becomes as follows:
(4)
Thus when this value is compared with the value of the growth opportunity before the
real estate price increase, the value of the growth opportunity decreases by the following
value, DVG, as the price of real estate rises:
(5)
That is, the value of the future investment opportunity of the ﬁrm decreases by the
shaded area in Exhibit 2 due to the real estate price increase and thus the value of the
ﬁrm’s growth opportunity decreases by that amount.
However, the above results do not apply for the assets that the ﬁrm currently holds.
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Changes in Investment Decisions for the Firm’s Growth Opportunity Due to
the Real Estate Price Increase under No Debt FinancingThat is, since the price of the assets currently held by the ﬁrm is reﬂected as a sunk cost,
the ﬁrm’s production opportunity will not be changed by even the current change in the
asset price.
In order to see this, suppose that a ﬁrm has purchased real estate at a price of VL in
period 0. Exhibit 3 represents the determination of a ﬁrm’s production at this time. If it
were not for additional expectations of an increase in price after a ﬁrm’s purchase of real
estate, it would be favorable for the ﬁrm to begin production in period 1 when the future
value (in period 1) for VL in period 0, VL(11r) (r5riskless interest rate), is less than
CF(s). Otherwise, it would be favorable4 for the ﬁrm not to produce. Accordingly, when
there are no additional expectations of increase in real estate prices, the production
period for existing real estate holdings of a ﬁrm begins with sa.
Suppose that the real estate price of a ﬁrm is expected to increase by DML¢ in period 1
after purchase.5 If a ﬁrm does not hold real estate at this time, production does not begin
at a point such as sc. However, if a ﬁrm has already purchased real estate in period 0,
production begins at the point sc. The reason is that in case production begins at sc, the
proﬁt of net investment, CF(sc)2VL(11r), which is the production revenue minus
acquisition cost, is greater than 0. Also since the real estate price of the ﬁrm after its
production in period 1 is expected to increase by DML¢, the ﬁrm gets a capital gain due
to the increase in real estate value as well as the proﬁt from production.
In the end, this kind of logic holds for all s in sa¢s¢sb in Exhibit 3. Therefore the value
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sa sc sbDVL5amount of increase in real estate value now (t50) due to DML¢ of real
estate price increase in period 1.
If this logic is continued, it is expected to lead to a one-to-one relationship between
increases in the present value of real estate (DVL) and those in the value of a ﬁrm’s
existing assets (VA). That is,
(7)
Therefore other things being equal, and if capital markets are efﬁcient, the existing
value of a ﬁrm’s real estate assets generally increases by the amount of increase in real
estate value. The reason is that even if it is expected that the price of existing real estate
held by the ﬁrm will increase, this does not affect the production opportunity with the
existing assets held by the ﬁrm. Since capital markets are efﬁcient, VA changes by the
amount of change in VL if change in real estate value is rapidly and fully reﬂected in the
value of the ﬁrm.
Meanwhile, expectations of a real estate price increase (decrease) limit (increase) the
growth opportunities of the ﬁrm and then decrease (increase) the value of the ﬁrm’s
growth. Accordingly, the amount needed for additional investments in future real estate
is inversely related to the growth value. Furthermore, it is expected that the growth value
of a ﬁrm decreases (increases) in line with the increase (decrease) in the real estate
holdings of a ﬁrm, as well as increase (decrease) in the additional real estate investment
needed for growth opportunity. That is: 
(8)
The reason is that DVG/DML can be expected to be less than 0 according to the logic
above. If it is assumed that the additional amount of real estate holdings needed for the
future growth opportunity investment is DL and additional expected value for a unit of
real estate in period 1 is DP1, the DML is equal to DP1 · DL.6 Also if we assume that the
amount of existing real estate holdings of a ﬁrm is L, VL is as follows:
(9)
As long as DL/L is positive (1), DVg/DVL becomes negative (2). Accordingly, the growth
opportunity value of a ﬁrm is inversely related to the value of the existing real estate.
The change in the total value of a ﬁrm due to change in the value of existing real estate
holdings is therefore less than unity. If the existing asset value of a ﬁrm increases by the
amount of real estate value increase, the growth value of the ﬁrm will decrease.
The effect due to a change in expectations of real estate price increases in period 1
above is analyzed. However, there exists an additional reason why a price increase in the
existing real estate of the ﬁrm is inversely related to its growth opportunity value.
Suppose that the price of the ﬁrm’s real estate holdings has increased by DP0 in period
1. At this time, the value of existing real estate of the ﬁrm in period 0, VL, increases by
DP0 · L, and then the value of existing asset holding of the ﬁrm, VA, increases by DP0 · L.
However, price increases for a unit of real estate in period 0 gives rise to additional
expectations of price increase in the future for real estate.
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investment opportunity of a ﬁrm decreases when the expected amount needed for future
real estate investment increases, DVG/E(DML) is clearly less than 0. However, total sign




DPo5amount of price increase for a unit of real estate in period 0 (now); 
E(DP1)5expected amount of additional price increase for a unit of real estate
in period 1 (future);
DL5amount of real estate needed additionally for growth opportunity in
period 1 (future); and
L5amount of real estate that a ﬁrm holds in period 0 (now).
Here DL/L is positive(1) as long as L is greater than 0. Accordingly, the total sign of
DVG/DVL depends on the sign of the parenthesized bracket. Here:
(11)
However, when the actual price formation process in the Korean real estate market is
considered, the ratio E(DP1)/DP0 is generally expected to be greater than 21. This is
because, under the general assumption that the price formation of the real estate follows
a random walk, E(DP1) is on average approximately 0. In this case the above ratio,
E(DP1)/DP0 is evidently greater than 21. 
In addition to this, Korean economists believe that price bubbles are strong in the
Korean real estate market (see Kim, 1991; Kim and Cheong, 1991). The asset price
bubble is dependent on several factors, such as a rational bubble, an information bubble
and fads. But the reason why a price bubble, once formed, lasts for a long time, is that
destabilizing speculation exists in the market.7 Then investors expect that the future price
will also rise as the current price increases. As a result, an excess demand for an asset lasts
so that the asset price increase continues for long periods.
In fact, the above phenomenon is continuously evidenced in the Korean real estate
market. In the meantime, if we analyze the background to the real estate price increase in
Korea, once real estate prices increase, investors on the street expect that real estate price
increases will become larger since the real estate brokers or the press stir them up.
Accordingly, the demand for purchase of real estate increases prior to an anticipated rise,
and then prices do in fact increase. The price increase again stimulates demand for real
estate, producing the vicious circle between price increases and a rise in demand.
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CORPORATE REAL ESTATE, VALUE OF THE FIRM IN KOREA 279It is not still clear how serious the phenomenon of destabilizing speculation is in the
Korean real estate market. However, according to Kim’s recent study (1991), it is
generally estimated that price bubble effects are continuously presented in Korean real
estate prices.8
If destabilizing speculation dominates Korean real estate prices, the relationship
between DP0 and E(DP1) is expected to be positive. The reason is that the increase in the
current price of real estate induces an expectation of an additional future price increase,
and then the ratio of E(DP1) to DP0 is expected to change in the same direction. Therefore
in view of the realities of Korean real estate markets such as the above, the sign of
DVG/DVL is generally expected to be negative (2).
The Case with Debt Financing
Myers (1977) analyzes a ﬁrm’s growth opportunity value when debt ﬁnancing occurs. His
analysis shows that if the debt matures after the ﬁrm’s state is known, then the value of
the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity decreases when the project is ﬁnanced with debt.
That is, since a ﬁrm selects the growth opportunity from the point sa at the intersection
point of the amount of real estate investment, ML(s), in period 1 and the line CF(s) in
case of no debt use, the value of a ﬁrm’s growth opportunity is given as in equation (4)
above.
In contrast, if the ﬁrm makes a debt contract to repay the amount D at period 1, the
investment for the growth opportunity begins at the point sd. In this case, the
shareholders’ value for the growth opportunity (VEG), the debt value (VBG), and the total
value for the growth opportunity (VG) are given as follows:
(12a)
     
VE y s CF s ML s D d s G Sd = - +
¥ ò ( )[ ( ) ( ) ] { } ,
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Changes in Investment Decisions Due to Real Estate Price Increases in Case of
Debt Financing(12b)
(12c)
Therefore when the ﬁrm uses debt, the loss of the growth opportunity is represented by
the shaded area with slanted lines in Exhibit 3, and the value loss for this case is
represented as follows:
(13)
Suppose now that the amount of real estate investment needed for the ﬁrm in period 1
is expected to rise by DML.9
Then, since in this case the investment for the future growth opportunity begins at the
point se in Exhibit 3, the net value of the opportunity for the shareholders is given as
follows:
(14)
Also, the value of the debtholder receiving D at period 1 is given as:
(15)
Thus, the total value of the growth opportunity represented by the sum of the value of the
shareholders and that of the debtholders is as follows:
(16)
When this value is compared with the total value of the debt-use ﬁrm for which the
expected amount of real estate investment needed is ML(s) only, the amount of real estate
investment in period 1 increases by DML. Thus it can be shown that the value of the
ﬁrm’s growth opportunity decreases in total by the following amount:
DVG5DVEG1DVDG
(17)
The ﬁrst term VEG on the right-hand side of the equation corresponds to the shaded
area with vertical lines in Exhibit 3. This value loss is equivalent to the value loss of the
ﬁrm with no debt ﬁnancing.
When the ﬁrm uses debt, however, it loses an additional value represented by the
shaded area with horizontal lines in Exhibit 3. The value of the future growth
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CORPORATE REAL ESTATE, VALUE OF THE FIRM IN KOREA 281opportunity when using debt decreases additionally by DVDG, in comparison with that
with no debt ﬁnancing. Therefore, when real estate prices increase, the value decrease for
the future growth opportunity becomes larger according to how heavily the ﬁrm uses
debt ﬁnancing.
Then who bears this value loss in the end? Myers (1977) showed that, assuming the
rational expectation of debtholders, the shareholders ultimately bear the value loss of the
growth opportunity. That is, if debtholders rationally expect that this kind of value loss
will occur in advance, they would reﬂect the loss in the ﬁnancial contract in terms of
interest or the price of the ﬁnancial claim. Thus the loss is transferred to the shareholders
in the end.
According to this argument, the additional value loss, DVDG, is expected to be borne
ultimately by the shareholders. Also if we assume that all proﬁts and losses due to the real
estate price change belong to the shareholders in the end, the change of the shareholders’
value due to the real estate price increase will be adjusted as follows:
(18)
where:
VE5total capital value of a ﬁrm;
VEa5equity value for assets currently held by the ﬁrm; and
VEG5equity value for a ﬁrm’s new investment opportunity.
Since the decrease in the value of the growth opportunity is greater as the debt ratio
becomes greater in case of debt-use ﬁrm, other things being equal, changes in the equity
value due to change in the real estate price, DVE/DVL, are expected to become much less
than unity as a ﬁrm’s debt ratio becomes higher.
Real Productivity and the Value of the Growth Opportunity
In the above discussion we did not consider the cause of the real estate price increase.
However, depending upon what its causes are, the effect on the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity
value may be different. For example, suppose that the marginal productivity per unit of
the real estate increases due to some external factors. In this case, other things being
equal, the demand for the real estate will increase as the marginal productivity increases.
Further, if the supply of its real estate is limited or increases too slowly to meet demand,
then its price rises.
However, if the real estate prices’s increases are caused by a marginal productivity
increase, the value loss of the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity would not occur. For example,
suppose that the production function q(x) changes to q¢(x) as in (18), as the marginal
productivity of the real estate increases. For all s:
(19)
where: xi5ith production factor.
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way, if expected cash ﬂows in each state along with expectations of real estate price
increase both rise as much as the amount of expected increase in real estate price, the
value of the ﬁrm’s growth does not change. That is, suppose that the real estate price rises
from ML(s) to ML(s)1DML and that the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow in each state increases from the
original CF(s) to CF¢(s) as the marginal productivity of the real estate increases. Then, as
shown in Figure 4, even though the real estate price rises, the beginning acceptance point
of the new investment opportunity is still maintained as sa. Therefore, the value of the
growth opportunity does not change even though the real estate price rises.
The above result offers the basis for the next empirical test. If the main cause of the real
estate price increase was due to the productivity increase, the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity
value is not inﬂuenced by the real estate price change. If other things are equal and
capital markets are efﬁcient so that the change in real estate price is properly reﬂected in
the ﬁrm’s market value (or equity value), then the ﬁrm’s market value will change by the
same amount as the real estate value change.
On the other hand, if the real estate price increase was due to a bubble price un-
accompanied by the ﬁrm’s real productivity increase or if the real estate price increase
exceeds the productivity increase, the value of the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity will
diminish.
Research Design
Hypotheses and Model Building
The following hypotheses drawing on the results in section two are proposed:
H0 : DVEt / DVLt51
H1 : DVEt / DVLt¢1 , (20)
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Exhibit 5
Determination of Investment Decisions for the Firm’s Growth Opportunity








DVEt5incremental value of the ﬁrm’s equity at t; and
DVLt5incremental value of the ﬁrm’s real estate at t.
The null hypothesis is consistent with the hypothesis that expectations of a real estate
price increase are caused by the improvement in the real marginal productivity of the real
estate.
It was analyzed in section two that the equity value of a ﬁrm would increase by the
amount of increase in real estate value, since the value loss of a ﬁrm’s growth
opportunity is not caused even by a real estate price increase in case the marginal
productivity of real estate increases. However, the rejection of the null hypothesis can be
accepted as evidence supporting the hypothesis that expectations of a real estate price
increase are formed by a bubble. If expectations of a real estate price increase are formed
by the price bubble with only an accompanying increase in marginal productivity, the
expectations constrain the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity and then it is expected that the
amount of equity value rise due to real estate price increase will be less than that of real
estate value increase.
However, the above interpretation needs some preconditions. First of all, it
presupposes informational efﬁciency of capital markets so that all the information about
increases and decreases in real estate value are fully and promptly reﬂected in stock
values in capital markets. If capital markets are efﬁciently responsive to information
related to real estate, it is very difﬁcult to judge whether rejection of the null hypothesis is
caused by informational inefﬁciency of markets or a real estate price bubble. Thus the
above hypothesis is a joint hypothesis along with informational efﬁciency of markets.
Second, in reality, changes in equity value of a ﬁrm are inﬂuenced by several factors
such as ﬁnancial risks as well as changes in real estate value. Thus incremental value of
equity in the hypothesis (20), DVE, should be apprehended as an incremental effect rather
than this effect. So proper control for factors other than real estate is required.
Third, it is supposed in making the above hypothesis (20) that changes in real estate
value do not affect debt value. That is, it is regarded that all the effects due to changes in
real estate value are reﬂected in equity value. If the incremental effect on a ﬁrm’s value
due to changes in real estate value is partly reﬂected in the debt value, the effect on equity
value can differ from this effect, even though there is a one-to-one linkage running
between changes in real estate value and a ﬁrm’s market value.
In fact, in a situation where loans against real estate collateral are general practice in
the case of ﬁnancial institutions’ loans, as in Korea, the possibility that changes in real
estate value affect debt value is great. However, since the clear effects of this are not
known as of now, let us leave this effect out of consideration in this paper.
In order to test the hypothesis (20), both the numerator and the denominator of (20)
are divided by VEjt21. Then we obtain the following null hypothesis for the jth ﬁrm.
(21)
where:
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VOLUME 13, NUMBER 3, 1997VEjt215equity value of the ﬁrm at t21; and
VLjt215value of the ﬁrm’s real estate at t21.
Thus the above equation can be rearranged as follows:
(22)
where:
Rjt5DVEjt / VEjt215return on jth stock at t; and
RLt5DVLjt / VLjt215rate of increase for the jth ﬁrm’s real estate value at t.
Suppose that rates of the real estate value increase, R
j
Lt, are equal for all ﬁrms denoted
as RLt. Further, in order to control the effects other than that of the real estate price











bj5a regression coefﬁcient of the market portfolio;
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~
mt5the market portfolio return; and
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jt5an error term satisfying the Ordinary Least Square estimation conditions.











However, it is impossible to estimate the coefﬁcients usng the equation (24) itself. The
reason is that time-series data about the real estate ratio needed to estimate the equation
are not available. In order to avoid these problems, the method that Black, Jensen and
Scholes (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) used in testing the validity of CAPM can
be used.10
That is, in the ﬁrst step, the coefﬁcient, bj, is estimated through the equation (23), using
time-series data about rates of stock return of each sample ﬁrm. And then the
coefﬁcients, g0, g1 and g2 of the following equation are estimated using cross-sectional
data at time t, with bj estimated in the previous step and the real estate ratio as an









where: b ˆj 5beta of ﬁrm j estimated through a market model.













CORPORATE REAL ESTATE, VALUE OF THE FIRM IN KOREA 285The coefﬁcient with which we are concerned especially in equation (25) is g2. If the
argument mentioned above is right, the coefﬁcient, g2, should be equal to RLt under the
null hypothesis of equation (20).
A Single-Factor Model and A Multi-Factor Model
Equations (24) and (25) in the previous section again raise the question of whether the
basic return generating structure in capital markets is a single-factor model or a multi-
factor model and the traditional question about the validity of CAPM. As well known,
the conclusion supporting CAPM generally was made11 according to the results of a test
on the validity of CAPM by Black et al. (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) through
a model similar to equation (25).
However, Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), Keim (1983), and Basu (1983), etc.
discovered that the variables such as P/E ratio and ﬁrm size other than beta would be
important factors explaining asset returns. Also Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger and
Ramaswamy (1979) established that dividend returns would be an important factor
affecting expected returns on asset if personal income tax existed.
Those studies selected different methods to improve the efﬁciency of estimation. But the
method is basically the same for most studies. That is, ﬁrst of all, beta is estimated using a
market model such as the previous equation (23). And after the portfolio construction
based upon the estimated beta, a cross-sectional regression for each portfolio in the next
period which involves estimated beta and other variables is performed using a model
constructed similarly to equation (25).12 But the variables other than beta involved in a
cross-sectional analysis are different according to the object of study.
From its point of view, equation (25) can be regarded as a model testing a multi-factor
characteristic of stock returns. Of course, equation (25) is not a model derived by the
equilibrium condition. However, if the coefﬁcient, g2, is discovered to be signiﬁcant
through cross-sectional analysis using equation (25), it provides evidence that CAPM is a
misspeciﬁed model that does not involve real estate ratio as an important variable of
stock return determination. However, if the coefﬁcient, g2, is not different from 0 in a
statistical sense, CAPM is judged to be a well-speciﬁed model for the real estate ratio.
As is well known, ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors are not priced by a diversiﬁcation effect from the
viewpoint of portfolio theory. The real estate ratio of a ﬁrm corresponds to an
unsystematic factor that is not related to a market factor. Accordingly, if CAPM is right,
the responsive coefﬁcient, g2, for the real estate ratio in equation (25) will show a value
near 0 in a statistical sense. But since many studies suggest the possibility that CAPM is
a misspeciﬁed model, it is an empirical subject of interest as to whether the real estate
holdings ratio of a ﬁrm can explain such factors or not.
The Sample and Test Procedures
The effect of the real estate price change is analyzed with equations (23) and (25). For this
analysis, a sample was selected according to the following:
· listed manufacturing ﬁrms except wholesale and retailing ﬁrms for the period
1987–91;
· ﬁrms for which sixty monthly rates of returns for the past ﬁve years including the
current year were available for the period 1987–91.
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1,319. Then for those ﬁrms, book-value of land holdings, paid-in capital, total assets, and
debt amounts were examined. And using such data, the ratio of the real estate value to
equity value of each ﬁrm was calculated based upon book-value year by year.
The ratio of the real estate value to equity value in (25), (VLjt21 / VEjt21) should be
based upon the market value. But as the market values of the real estate of each ﬁrm are
not observable, the ratios were calculated based upon the book-value.13
Also, the ﬁrm’s real estate includes buildings and equipment as well as land. But since
the effect of the land price change was the most serious in Korea, only land was included
in the analysis.
Using the above data, we take the following procedures:
· Time-series regression analyses are made for equation (23), using monthly stock
returns of each ﬁrm as a dependent variable and stock market returns as an
independent variable for the period 1987–91. As a result, market parameters aj
and bj for each ﬁrm are estimated. In the regression, monthly return data for
sixty months of the past ﬁve years including the current year are used and returns
based upon the Korean composite stock price index (KOSPI) are used as the
market return.
· Applying equation (25), a cross-sectional OLS regression analysis is made using
all the samples of the ﬁrm.14 In the regression, bj of each ﬁrm estimated in the
previous step and the ratio of equity value to book value of real estate holdings
are used as independent variables. At this time the value of the previous year
from the period of a cross-sectional analysis is used for the ratio of real estate
holdings. And yearly returns calculated based upon each ﬁrm’s monthly returns
are used as a dependent variable.
· If we follow the above logic, yearly g2 estimated in equation (25) needs to be
compared with the yearly rate of price change for the land realized for the
corresponding year. If there is no large difference between g2 and the realized
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Exhibit 6
Rate of Price Increase by Land Use and by Classiﬁcation of Land Category
during the Period 1987–1991 in Korea*
(Unit: %)
1978 1988 1989 1990 1991 Avg.
National average 14.67 27.33 31.97 20.58 12.78 21.52
1 Commerce area 14.46 24.77 29.89 20.96 12.22 20.46
Industry area 27.81 27.45 32.36 22.10 15.96 25.14
2
For commercial use 15.10 26.47 24.35 19.50 13.97 19.88
For industrial use 29.68 30.34 26.62 21.64 15.08 24.13
3 Inﬂation rate** 3.0 7.1 5.7 8.6 9.3 6.74
*Rates of price increase in 1987–89 are actual values on the basis of the end of the 4/4 quarter,
and those in 1990–91 are actual values on the basis of the end of the value of January for the
corresponding year.
**based upon the consumer price indexyearly land return, then the null hypothesis is accepted. Otherwise the null
hypothesis is rejected.
The rates of price increase for land realized during the period 1987–91 based upon land
price index by use and by the classiﬁcation of land categories released by the Ministry of
Construction are listed in Exhibit 6. As shown in the exhibit, total land prices during the
period 1987–91 in Korea recorded a 21.52% increase on average. Especially during the
period 1988–89, the rate of land price increase was the largest. Average national land
prices increased by 31.97% in 1989, showing the largest rate of increase out of the ﬁve
years analyzed. In the case of land for industrial use, the price increased by 30.34% in
1988, and from the viewpoint of the classiﬁcation of land category, the price increase of
land for industry use was larger than that of land for commercial use. For example, price
of land for commercial use during the period 1987–91 increased by 19.88% on average,
while price of land for industrial use increased by 24.13%.
Results
Cross-Sectional Results by Year
Exhibit 7 shows the cross-sectional results by year. The coefﬁcients of the real estate
holdings ratio, g2, are close to zero for the period 1988–90 except for 1987, for which the
ﬁgure is 1.24%.
On the other hand, the coefﬁcient of g2 for 1991 is signiﬁcantly negative at 1.93% at a
95% signiﬁcance level. Notably the response coefﬁcient to beta, g1, is also signiﬁcantly
negative, implying that the speciﬁc situation in the 1991 stock market is reﬂected in the
coefﬁcients g1 and g2. Actually in 1991, the Korean stock market was generally bearish.
Considering these results, the degree of the effect of stock returns on ﬁrms’ real estate
holdings is generally estimated to be almost zero in the Korean stock market.
When compared with the fact that the rate of national land price increase is on average
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Exhibit 7
Cross-Sectional Results by Year
(Unit: %)
Year  g 0 g 1 g 2
(# of sample) (t) (t) (t)
87 3.5213*** 3.7975*** 1.2368
(208) (4.36) (5.38) (1.06)
88 0.5131 4.0133*** 20.7760
(248) (0.97) (9.34) (20.78)
89 1.6046*** 0.3394 20.2343
(286) (4.65) (1.09) (20.37)
90 20.6752** 20.9807*** 20.3461
(288) (22.23) (23.31) (0.74)
91 2.6172*** 24.6392*** 21.9304**
(289) (4.57) (27.97) (22.25)
**, *** are signiﬁcant at the 5% and 1% signiﬁcance levels, respectively; t represents student 
t-value.over 20% for the period 1987–91, the coefﬁcient, g2, is overwhelmingly lower. This result
can be interpreted as evidence to support the null hypothesis that increases in real estate
prices are mainly due to price bubbles rather than to marginal productivity increase in
real estate in Korea. That is, the real estate price increase is a factor that increases the
stock price by increase in the value of the ﬁrm’s assets, while also a factor that serves to
depress the stock price by reducing the ﬁrm’s growth opportunity value. These two effects
largely offset each other, leaving precise interpretation of the coefﬁcient, g2, unclear.
However, the above interpretation seems unreasonable on the following grounds. First
of all, it is reasonable that the information about the ﬁrm’s real estate holdings is
interpreted to have a weak effect on the stock returns. In other words, the variable for a
ﬁrm’s real estate holdings in the CAPM framework implies a nonsystematic factor that is
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Exhibit 8
Yearly Cross-Sectional Results and Firm Size
(Unit: %)
g 0 g 1 g 2
Year Size (n) (t) (t) (t)
Small (69) 5.3545*** 0.5012*** 3.9147***
(3.99) (0.41) (1.55)
1987 Middle (69) 0.5276 6.9208*** 1.6935
(0.24) (3.63) (0.56)
Large (68) 3.0665** 4.6410*** 0.4736
(2.23) (4.40) (0.30)
Small (82) 0.9590 1.7438*** 2.6932
(1.42) (2.68) (1.58)
1988 Middle (82) 0.2584 3.9284*** 0.1011
(0.29) (5.68) (0.06)
Large (84) 1.1963 4.9925*** 24.2621**
(0.98) (5.74) (22.32)
Small (95) 1.5944*** 0.6749 22.8808*
(2.66) (1.33) (21.72)
1989 Middle (95) 1.7275*** 0.4617 20.0075
(2.70) (0.65) (20.01)
Large (96) 1.8457*** 20.1257 0.1980
(3.03) (20.25) (0.24)
Small (95) 20.2246 21.4138*** 0.9235
(20.46) (22.96) (0.89)
1990 Middle (96) 20.3452 21.3351** 20.1220
(20.61) (22.16) (20.14)
Large (97) 21.7974*** 20.1135 1.2189
(23.17) (20.23) (1.66)
Small (96) 1.9025 24.6593*** 1.8625
(1.82) (23.93) (0.85)
1991 Middle (96) 2.3862** 24.0179*** 22.2283
(2.21) (23.48) (21.65)
Large (97) 3.2228 25.0846 23.2643
(3.07) (25.72) (22.36)
*, **, *** are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance levels, respectively; student t-values
are in parentheses.not reﬂected in stock returns. Second, a ﬁrm’s actual holdings of real estate are not public
information. The actual value differs from that represented by book value. Accordingly,
it can be interpreted that stock returns are not responsive to the information about the
real estate holdings on ﬁnancial statements.
On the other hand, as can be seen from Exhibit 7, the coefﬁcients g0 and g1 are
statistically signiﬁcant. If CAPM holds true, g0 should be identical with the riskless rate-
of-return or the rate-of-return on a zero-beta portfolio. And g1 should be identical with
the risk premium of the market portfolio.15 Here this kind of test is omitted. However, the
cross-sectional results generally prove that these two variables are important explanatory
variables in explaining stock returns in the Korean stock market.
Yearly Cross-Sectional Results by Debt Ratio
Theoretically, the expectation is that the higher the debt ratio, the lower will be the
coefﬁcient g2. Exhibit 8 shows the empirical results in respect of this effect. Exhibit 8 is a
summary of the cross-sectional regression results obtained when the samples are
classiﬁed by the debt ratio every year for the period 1987–91.
The debt ratio used is the ratio of book-value debt to asset value for the previous year
of the cross-sectional analysis period. Theoretically, the degree of the loss of the growth
opportunity value depends not on the amount of the existing debt of the ﬁrm, but on the
amount of the debt taken on for the new investment opportunity. However, since it is
difﬁcult to get hold of details of the ﬁnancing planned for the growth opportunity, it is
assumed here that the ﬁnancing for the opportunity is identical to that represented by the
existing capital structure of the ﬁrm.16
In Exhibit 8, g2 for the high-debt ﬁrm is generally lower than that for the low-debt ﬁrm.
The size of g2 for the high-debt ﬁrm in 1987 is lower by 3.44% than that for the low-debt
ﬁrm. In 1988, the former is 2.69%, while the latter is 24.26% at a 95% signiﬁcance level,
representing a gap of 6.95%.
Also in 1991, the former is 1.86%, while the latter is 23.26% at a 95% signiﬁcance level,
representing a 5.13% gap. Accordingly, for three years out of the ﬁve years analyzed, the
former is lower than the latter. For the same three years, the size of g2 systematically
decreases as the debt ratio increases. This result is consistent with the theory that the
higher the ﬁrm’s debt ratio, the larger the loss of the growth opportunity value will be.
Most notably, g2 for the high-debt ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly negative in two years out of the
ﬁve, suggesting that for a high-debt ﬁrm, the higher the real estate holding, the more the
rate of stock returns tends to decrease. Accordingly the empirical result for the analysis
by debt ratio supports the theory generally, unlike in the result for the analysis by year.
Only in 1989 is g2 for a low-debt ﬁrm insigniﬁcantly negative. On the other hand, g2 for
a high-debt ﬁrm is almost zero and the difference of g2 value between a low-debt and a
high-debt ﬁrm is not signiﬁcant. So empirical evidence support of the theory is not
consistent over all the years.
Yearly Cross-Sectional Result by Size
The above cross-sectional results by debt-ratio suggest that the theory is generally
consistent with the empirical evidence. Here the same sample is analyzed by cross-
sectional size. Exhibit 9 represents the results by size. The asset value given by the book
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ﬁrm’s size. The coefﬁcient g2 does not represent a consistent difference by ﬁrm size. There
is little difference in g2 among large, medium and small ﬁrms in 1989 and 1990. And g2 for
large ﬁrms is higher than that for small ﬁrms in 1987. On the other hand, g2 for small
ﬁrms is higher rather than that for large ﬁrms in 1988 and 1991.
And the size of g2 does not change systematically according to the expansion in the size
of the ﬁrm for all the sample periods in Exhibit 9. g2 for large ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly
negative at the 95% signiﬁcance level in 1988, but insigniﬁcantly negative in 1991.
However, in 1991, g2 for medium ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly negative at the 99% signiﬁcance
level, but that for large ﬁrms is not. Hence, for this period, g2 does not change
systematically according to changes in ﬁrm size.
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Exhibit 9
Cross-Sectional Results by Debt Ratio
(Unit: %)
g 0 g 1 g 2
Year Size (n) (t) (t) (t)
Low (69) 5.7786*** 1.7009 0.0682
(4.30) (1.54) (0.04)
1987 Middle (69) 3.5699** 3.6831*** 2.0610
(0.56) (2.70) (0.92)
High (68) 22.651 7.2528*** 2.1950
(20.71) (5.49) (0.83)
Low (82) 0.7728 3.2985*** 0.7544
(0.91) (5.12) (0.52)
1988 Middle (82) 1.1200 2.2007*** 0.9358
(1.44) (3.31) (0.56)
High (84) 21.5621 7.6135*** 23.7545**
(21.60) (9.23) (22.1332)
Low (95) 1.5791*** 0.6348 20.7520
(2.69) (1.38) (20.64)
1989 Middle (95) 0.9088 1.0534 20.3062
(1.41) (1.56) (20.29)
High (96) 3.1534*** 21.4197** 20.5218
(4.63) (22.27) (20.46)
Low (95) 20.7251 21.0016** 0.8621
(21.39) (22.04) (0.98)
1990 Middle (96) 20.5099 20.9101 20.4881
(20.92) (21.52) (20.56)
High (97) 20.9926* 20.8387* 0.8521
(21.90) (21.74) (1.18)
Low (96) 0.3618 23.4894*** 0.1720
(0.34) (23.16) (0.09)
1991 Middle (96) 3.2040*** 24.1020*** 23.6769***
(3.80) (24.17) (23.54)
High (97) 4.2162*** 26.0065 22.0704
(4.03) (26.05) (21.21)
*, **, *** are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance levels, respectively; student t-values
are in parentheses.These results provide a striking contrast to those by debt ratio. They also imply that
the effect by debt ratio is unrelated to ﬁrm size.
Conclusions
A sharp and continuous increase in real estate prices during the past few decades has
enormously changed the economic behaviour of most economic units in Korea. Most of
all, it is believed to have greatly inﬂuenced ﬁrm investment behavior and ﬁrm value.
In this study the theoretical relationship between real estate prices and the ﬁrm’s value
was analyzed. As a result of these analyses, it was found that expectations of real estate
price increase raise the value of assets currently held by the ﬁrm on the one hand. But on
the other hand, expectations for increases in real estate prices will cause a value loss to
the ﬁrm by increasing potential investment costs for its future growth opportunities.
Therefore, when expectations of a real estate price increases are caused by a price bubble,
the total increase in a ﬁrm’s value is expected to be lower than the increase in real estate
value. However, if expectations of real estate price increase are caused by an increase in
marginal productivity, the value loss for growth opportunities of the ﬁrm will not occur.
Also it is expected that the loss of the growth opportunity value due to expectations of a
real estate price increase will be larger for debt-use ﬁrms than for zero-debt ﬁrms, and for
those higher-debt ﬁrms where debt is used.
In this study, these hypotheses are tested empirically, using the rates of return for
common stocks. First, in yearly cross-sectional analysis using yearly rates of common
stock returns as a dependent variable, and the systematic risk (b) of stock returns and the
ratio of equity to real estate holding as independent variables, the coefﬁcients for
explanatory variables were almost zero. This suggests that the ratio of real estate holdings
does not affect rates of common stock returns.
However, in case of cross-sectional tests stratiﬁed by the ﬁrm’s debt ratio, the size of the
coefﬁcient for the real estate holding variable is generally lower for high-debt ﬁrms than
for low-debt ﬁrms. This result is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis of this study
that the higher the debt ratio, the larger the loss of growth opportunity value. On the
other hand, in the case of cross-sectional tests by ﬁrm size, there are no systematic
changes in the coefﬁcient, unlike in the case of results by debt ratio. Accordingly, it is
estimated that the effect of debt ratio is rather clearer than that of ﬁrm size and that ﬁrm
size has no large effect on the effect by debt ratio.
These results are subject to the following limitations. First of all, the ratio of equity to
real estate holdings as an independent variable should be based upon market value, not
book value in empirical tests. But real estate data based upon market value are not
available. Second, in regression analyses, the simple ordinary least square (OLS) method
is used, so the coefﬁcient is not likely to be efﬁcient. Third, the theoretical effect of
changes in real estate value on debt value are not considered.
Notes
1If the real estate price in period 1 does not change according to state, s, ML(s) in Exhibit 1 will be
horizontal.
2A more detailed analysis will be provided in section two of the background to real estate price
increases.
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the size of increase is ML(s). Also under this assumption, the logic of this study does not change.
This study assumes (for convenience of analysis) that the real estate price in period 1 increases by
DML regardless of state.
4If present (period 0) real estate investment, VL, is converted into the future (period 1) value of
certainty, the value is VL(11r). The determination of production in period 1 is appraised based
upon the value in period 1.
5It is assumed that the expected value on real estate price increases in period 1 is DML¢ regardless
of state for convenience. Even if it is assumed that an increase in real estate prices is a function of
state s, that is, DML¢(s), it does not affect the logic of this study.
6If the amount of price increase in a unit of real estate in period 1 is dependent upon state, the
amount of price increase becomes DP(s).
7Refer to Kim (1991) concerning factors of price bubble formation and the phenomenon of a
destabilizing speculation.
8According to Kim’s study (1991), it is estimated that price bubbles such as the growing rational
bubble are long-run features that are continuously included in land prices (whether price nominal
or real). It was estimated in Kim’s study that a rational bubble existed continuously during 1982–90
in nominal land prices and during 1985–90 in real land prices. On the other hand, it was estimated
in the study that a price bubble did not exist for real housing prices, but one continuously existed for
nominal housing prices during 1987–90.
9Here also, even if it is assumed that the amount of real estate investment in period 1 increases by
DML(s), the logic of this study does not change.
10Of course, the method used here is not completely the same as that of Black et al. (1972) and
Fama and MacBeth (1973). In particular, they use a method that estimates the coefﬁcients through
portfolio construction in order to improve the efﬁciency of estimation.
11Their results generally support a zero-beta CAPM rather than the traditional CAPM of
Sharpe–Lintner–Mossin.
12In most studies, beta reestimated in the next period, not beta estimated in the portfolio
construction period, is used for cross-sectional regression analysis. Also there are several methods
for cross-sectional analysis, such as the OLS method based upon the assumption of homoscedastic
error terms (i.e., Fama and MacBeth) and the GLS method based upon the assumption of
heteroscedastic error terms (i.e., Black and Scholes, 1974)). Notably, for efﬁcient estimation,
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy used GLS and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) methods,
considering errors of a market model and estimation errors of beta.
13A limitation of this study is that the real estate holdings ratio here is based upon book value, not
market value. However, if the degree of alienation for market-to-book value is almost the same for
real estate and equity, the ratio calculated based upon book value can be used as a proxy for the
ratio based upon market value. Also, if the degree of alienation for book-to-market value for real
estate and equity is the same for all ﬁrms, the effect of alienation will be involved in the coefﬁcient,
r in equation (25).
14In case of a cross-sectional analysis for equation (25), the estimation method based upon the
portfolio construction method is used, in general, to improve the efﬁciency of estimation. Also, in
order to solve the problems, such as measurement errors of beta or heteroscedasticity of errors,
GLS or MLE methods rather than OLS are used. In this study, the GLS and MLE methods
suggested by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), as well as the OLS method, were used in the
estimation process. However, according to the estimation results of GLS and MLE, the efﬁciency
was not improved much when compared with OLS estimation results, and since, in some cases,
estimation coefﬁcients were shown to be insigniﬁcant, estimation results by the OLS method only
are reported in this study.
15Refers to the studies cited in the research design for further details about this.
16If the existing capital structure of the ﬁrm reﬂects the optimal capital structure and the ﬁnancing
CORPORATE REAL ESTATE, VALUE OF THE FIRM IN KOREA 293for the new investment opportunity is raised according to the optimal target value, the capital
structure for the growth opportunity will be identical to the existing one.
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